A review of the life and works of Jeremy Bentham, the "philosopher of legislation" and an analysis of his legacy in law and politics.

Classifying species as ‘native’ or ‘alien’ carries prescriptive force in the valuation and management of ‘nature’. But the classification itself and its application are contested, raising philosophical and geographical questions about place, space, rights, identity and belonging. This paper discusses leading critiques of the native/alien paradigm, including its conceptual fluidity, dichotomous rigidity and ethical difficulties, as well as the incendiary charge of xenophobia. It argues that valorizing ‘native nature’ as inherently the ‘best nature’ is not only obsolete but impracticable in (...) the Anthropocene, and that the preeminence of biogeographic origins should be replaced with a pragmatic focus on species’ behavior. (shrink)

A powerful and original statement on the nature of film and the intimate relation of "film imagination" to our lives as human beings in the world.

In El Salvador from 1978 to 1988, contraceptive use among married women 15–44 years of age increased from 34% to 47%, and the total fertility rate declined from 6·3 to 4·6 children per woman. Most of this change took place from 1978 to 1985. Sterilization is the most prevalent method used, but nearly one-half of the women who are sterilized did not use any contraception before their operation. Few young couples use reversible methods of contraception to space births or delay (...) the start of childbearing. On average, women wait 8 years after marriage and have nearly three children before they use contraception. (shrink)

Renouvier's place in nineteenth-century French thought -- Renouvier's critique of Comtean positivism -- Renouvier and mathematics -- Renouvier on evolution -- Kant, free will, and the social contract -- Hypothesis and convention in Renouvier's philosophy of science.

N- and O-linked glycan structures of cell surface and secreted glycoproteins serve a variety of functions related to cell–cell communication in systems affecting development and disease. The more sophisticated N-glycan biosynthesis pathway of metazoans diverges from that of yeast with the appearance of the medial-Golgi β-N-acetylglucosaminyltransferases (GlcNAc-Ts). Tissue-specific regulation of medial- and trans-Golgi glycosyltransferases contribute structural diversity to glycoproteins in metazoans, and this can affect their molecular properties including localization, half-life, and biological activity. Null mutations in glycosyltransferase genes positioned later (...) in the biosynthetic pathway disrupt expression of smaller subsets of glycan structures and are progressively milder in phenotype. In this review, we examine data on targeted mutations affecting glycosylation in mice and congenital mutations in man, with a view to understanding the molecular functions of glycan structures as modulators of glycoprotein activity. Finally, pathology associated with the expression of GlcNAc-Ts in cancer and diabetes-induced cardiac hypertrophy suggest that inhibitors of these enzymes may have therapeutic value. BioEssays 21:412–421, 1999. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

What does it mean to consider the world of AI through a Christian lens? Rapid developments in AI continue to reshape society, raising new ethical questions and challenging our understanding of the human person. Encountering Artificial Intelligence draws on Pope Francis’ discussion of a culture of encounter and broader themes in Catholic social thought in order to examine how current AI applications affect human relationships in various social spheres and offers concrete recommendations for better implementation. The document also explores questions (...) regarding personhood, consciousness, and the kinds of relationships humans might have with even the most advanced AI. Through these discussions, this book investigates the theoretical and practical challenges to interpersonal encounter raised by the age of AI. (AI Research Group for the Centre for Digital Culture of the Dicastery of Culture and Education of the Holy See). (shrink)

This article considers Henri Poincaré’s conventionalism in historical context by comparing his use of such terms as “convention” and “conventional” with Charles Renouvier’s. As Renouvier was very influential in late nineteenth-century France, this comparison can provide some insight into how the terms were understood at the time. Renouvier was a political philosopher as well as a philosopher of science. He drew an analogy between the conventions or social contracts that govern society at large and the conventions that governed communities (...) of researchers in mathematics and the sciences. Both kinds of conventions were living contracts for Renouvier, subject to revision and change. What emerges from the comparison is an interpretation of Poincaré’s conventionalism that belies the view that it is a rigid, unbending philosophy holding back scientific progress. Rather, it is one according to which scientists come together to form a temporary consensus about particular starting points in order to make research into nature possible yet retain the liberty to try something new when the old set of assumptions no longer proves fruitful. (shrink)

Renouvier was among the first philosophers in France to break with the nineteenth-century inductivist tradition and defend the use of hypotheses in science. Earlier in the century, the humanistically-educated eclectic spiritualist philosophers who dominated French academic life had followed Reid in proscribing the use of hypotheses. Renouvier, who was educated in the sciences, took up the Comtean positivist alternative and developed it further. He began by defending hypotheses that anticipate laws governing the phenomena, but then eventually adopted a more liberal (...) attitude towards hypotheses that postulate unobservable entities and processes as well. He also came to the realization that, from an epistemological point of view, all of empirical science is hypothetical. Renouvier used the tentative character of scientific knowledge as a premise from which to critique those who would claim scientific status for their social philosophies, and maintained a distinction between normative philosophical and empirical scientific inquiries.Keywords: Charles Renouvier; Auguste Comte; Positivism; Hypothesis; Eclectic spiritualism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reading As Poets Read: Following Mark StrandCharles BergerFor close to a decade now, in the third or fourth phase of his career, Mark Strand has been giving us poem after poem marked by his familiar voice—luminous, deceptively casual, witty, allusive—as he builds up a body of work that thinks and sings ever more deeply about the poet’s unavoidable life of allegory. This growing summa of poetic knowledge and readerly (...) pleasure demands, as the best lyric poetry always does, that readers give themselves over to the rigorous joys of figurative reading, figurative argument. You stare and stare at the poem until something flashes—linkages, interpretive genealogies, a conjunction of words that opens up arguments. Wittgenstein asked: “How can that which we understand in a flash, be put to a use?” Literary criticism, I think, provides an answer.Reading a poet like Strand shouldn’t send you running to the library for secondary source material; instead, you let your memory for poetry run. This assumes that you indeed possess a memory for poetry. Nowadays—enter the polemics—poems are not considered to be sufficient contexts for critical discourse. They need to be supplemented, bolstered, by “wider” cultural texts. The remarkable poetry being written around us counts for very little in the precincts of academic debate, even though so much of this poetry speaks directly to issues of great polemical importance. And it should go without saying that the deep pleasures of tracking poetic language, wherever you will let it take you, wherever you will take it, goes untasted. The poems Mark Strand has recently been writing show him, I think, at the height of his [End Page 177] power, as he thinks through the question of his place in poetry, the place of poetry in his life and ours, and the strange institution of poetry: so gripping in its hold on those who practice it as readers and writers, so hard to locate among the public monuments. The cultural critics don’t seem to understand how one is chosen by poetry, and how the kind of poetry you choose to read, to write, to teach, to remember, constitutes a deep part of your public and private being.At the same time, we should never espouse a defense of reading that limits us to the “poem-in-itself,” as if poems were not already layered, as if it were so easy to distinguish between imagination and interpretation. Poems have memories, as Rosanna Warren demonstrated so powerfully in her discussion of the formal genealogy of Auden’s Freud elegy. A poet like Mark Strand displays a ghostlier kind of memory that signals to us a little less overtly, but no less hauntingly. This is never more apparent than in the three new poems of his that I will now discuss: “Our Masterpiece is the Private Life,” “The Next Time,” and, briefly, “Great Dog Poem No. 2.” Since these poems have yet to be published in a volume, I need to quote them in their entirety.Our Masterpiece is the Private LifeIIs there something down by the water keeping itself from us, Some shy event, some secret of the light that falls upon the deep, Some source of sorrow that does not wish to be discovered yet? Our happiness says we should not care, that desire Could cast its rainbow over the coarse porcelain of the world’s skin And with its measures fill the air. Why look for more? Why not in the brightness of this weather allow ourselves to be Astonished by the music and the privilege of our passing?IIAnd now, my love, while the advocates of awfulness and sorrow [End Page 178] Push their dripping barge up and down the beach, let’s eat Our brill, and sip this beautiful white Beaune. True, the light is artificial, and we are not well-dressed. So what. We like it here. We like the bullocks in the field next door, We like the sound of wind passing over grass. The way you speak, In that low voice, our late night disclosures... why live For anything else? Our masterpiece is the private life.IIIStanding on... (shrink)

In a survey of information theory and some of its implications, Warren Weaver has proposed a distinction between engineering noise and semantic noise. Ordinary Spanish usage reflects this distinction quite neatly. If A speaks to B and B responds with no entiendo, it means ‘I have not heard your words, because of interfering sound or lack of attention; please transmit the same message again’; if he responds with no comprendo, it means ‘I heard you all right, but what I (...) heard doesn't make sense; please paraphrase or explain.’ Channel noise, thus, is the responsible factor when that which leaves a transmitter is not that which reaches the receiver; semantic noise is a discrepancy between the codes used by transmitter and receiver. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.3 (2001) 543-564 [Access article in PDF] Eduard Gans and the Crisis of Hegelianism Warren Breckman In a 1834 report on the development of economic associationism in France, Johannes Schön detected an echo in Germany, the stirrings of a debate over the "modern Associationswesen." This discussion, he believed, would be crucial to the future of the "national economy." 1 Schön was an (...) astute observer, for the German discussion of associationism in the early 1830s was indeed but a faint echo of the French; and insofar as the idea of association was addressed by prominent social writers in those years, it was generally greeted with suspicion. This was the case, for instance, with the liberal thinker Robert von Mohl, whose influential 1835 tract on the social question criticized the notion of proletarian associationism. Conversely, by the early 1840s, association was on many tongues as a panacea for the social ills of the age. By 1840 Mohl himself had embraced the "Assoziationsprinzip" as an antidote to the atomized condition of modern social life. 2Among the relatively small number of German writers who did champion association in the 1830s, the claims for its significance were already grandiose. Moses Hess's Die heilige Geschichte der Menschheit (1837) and August von Cieszkowski's Prolegomena zur Historiosophie (1838) both linked social solidarity to millenarian expectations of a new age of humanity. Even before Hess or Cieszkowski, the first German book on Charles Fourier, by one S. R. Schneider, bore the title Das Problem der Zeit und dessen Lösung durch die Assoziation (1834), while another, by Fr. Hr. Tappehorn, was headed Die vollkommene Association, als Vermittlerin der Einheit des Vernunftstaates und der Lehre Jesu (1834). Yet the enormous importance assigned to associationism [End Page 543] in these titles exposes the ambiguity of the idea itself. For if, as one historian has claimed, "free association can be regarded in principle as the central organizational form of modern or industrial society," 3 there was no agreement on its nature. Should the right of association be understood as liberal or socialist, individualistic or collectivist? Is free association the core idea and mode of interaction of a pluralistic and competitive civil society, or is it the principle of unification that will overcome pluralism and competition? These fundamental questions were to preoccupy nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century debates in areas as diverse as revolutionary theory, labor union activism, and the regulation of business cartels. However, in the 1830s, under the pressure of the newly perceived social question, the stirrings of industrialization in Germany, and the revival of democratic politics in the July Revolution, these issues first appeared with a force that drew the attention of intellectuals.Perhaps no German intellectual of the 1830s so perfectly embodies the implicit tensions of the idea of associationism as the Hegelian philosopher of law, Eduard Gans (1797-1839). A student of the Heidelberg legal scholar A. J. Thibaut, Gans later came to be considered by Hegel as one of his most brilliant followers. Once Gans became a professor in the Juristic Faculty at the University of Berlin in the mid-1820s, it was he, not Hegel, who taught a generation of students the intricacies of Hegelian political philosophy. Gans died in 1839 at the age of 42, felled at a luncheon by a stroke while in mid-sentence, a victim, according to the Hallische Jahrbücher, of his own passion for discussion. This volubility is more than evident in his oeuvre, which includes a multi-volume study of inheritance law in world history, dozens of essays on legal philosophy and political and legal issues in his native Prussia and Europe, a popular memoir, and an edition of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. He was instrumental, moreover, in creating the Society for Scientific Critique in 1826, the Hegelian "counter-academy" established in response to the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences' decision to exclude Hegel, and he was a founder of Die Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik, the organization's journal and the main organ of Hegelianism. At... (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe historical process underlying Darwin’s Origin of Species did not play a significant role in the early editions of the book, in spite of the particular inductivist scientific methodology it espoused. Darwin’s masterpiece did not adequately provide his sources or the historical perspective many contemporary critics expected. Later editions yielded the ‘Historical Sketch’ lacking in the earlier editions, but only under critical pressure. Notwithstanding the sources he provided, Darwin presented the Origin as an ‘abstract’ in order to avoid giving sources; (...) a compromise he acknowledged and undertook to set right in later editions, yet failed to provide throughout the six editions under his supervision. Darwin’s reluctance to publish the historical context of his theory and his sources, particularly sources which were also ‘precursors’, may be attributed as much to the matter of intellectual ownership as science, or even good literary practice. Of special concern to Darwin were issues of priority or originality over ‘descent with modification’ and especially over Natural Selection. Many later historians have argued that Darwin was unaware of the work of his precursors on Natural Selection. Darwin’s theory was an example of independent discovery, albeit along with such obscure precursors as Matthew or Wells, who were unknown to Darwin until after the publication of the Origin. Both Matthew and Wells had a medical education, like James Hutton or Erasmus Darwin earlier in the eighteenth century, or even Charles Darwin. Evolutionary theory, at least in Britain was a product largely of the medical evolutionists rather than the natural historians which ‘history’ has chosen to select for the focus of attention; and among the medical evolutionists the figure of John Hunter stands out as theorist, experimentalist and teacher: the medical evolutionists were predominantly the product of Hunter’s legacy or of the medical profession and particularly the Scottish Universities. Much recent Darwin scholarship has focused on the private Notebooks, to establish Darwin’s discovery of Natural Selection around 1837–1838 and demonstrate Darwin’s ignorance of his precursors; requiring an explicit acknowledgement by Darwin as the legitimate substantiation of any claim to prior influence. The precursors have been categorized as uniformly obscure or irrelevant to the science of evolution which may be defined exclusively as ‘Darwinian’. The inclination to acknowledge influences, however was not something Darwin was gratuitously given to doing, especially on matters of priority. The Notebooks are not Darwin’s private thoughts; from an early stage he considered them incipient public documents and later sought to protect them as proof of his originality. William C. Wells was not an obscure thinker, but a celebrated scientist whom Herschel, Darwin’s guide to scientific methodology, had recommended as providing a model of scientific method. Darwin discovered Wells through Herschel, and quickly acquired a copy of Wells’ recommended work, no later than 1831, and held it thereafter in his library at Down House. This book, the 1818 edition of Wells’ Two Essays contains a third essay, Wells’ account of Natural Selection. Later, in the Descent of Man Darwin acknowledged his separate discovery of the correlation of colour and disease immunity in man, also earlier recounted by Wells. (shrink)

The problem of justifying legal punishment has been at the heart of legal and social philosophy from the very earliest recorded philosophical texts. However, despite several hundred years of debate, philosophers have not reached agreement about how legal punishment can be morally justified. That is the central issue addressed by the contributors to this volume. All of the essays collected here have been published in the highly respected journal Philosophy & Public Affairs. Taken together, they offer not only significant proposals (...) for improving established theories of punishment and compelling arguments against long-held positions, but also ori-ginal and important answers to the question, "How is punishment to be justified?"Part I of this collection, "Justifications of Punishment," examines how any practice of punishment can be morally justified. Contributors include Jeffrie G. Murphy, Alan H. Goldman, Warren Quinn, C. S. Nino, and Jean Hampton. The papers in Part II, "Problems of Punishment," address more specific issues arising in established theories. The authors are Martha C. Nussbaum, Michael Davis, and A. John Simmons. In the final section, "Capital Punishment," contributors discuss the justifiability of capital punishment, one of the most debated philosophical topics of this century. Essayists include David A. Conway, Jeffrey H. Reiman, Stephen Nathanson, and Ernest van den Haag. (shrink)

Warren and Brandeis ' tort against invasion of privacy had chiefly a social goal: to enlist the courts to reinforce the norm of civility. Years later in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court announced a constitutional right of privacy that was personal in focus. Here and in subsequent rulings on abortion and the " right to die," it became apparent that Warren and Brandeis ' Victorian " right to be let alone" had metamorphosed into a right to autonomy, (...) whose amoeboid contours made prediction or even description a tricky business. But privacy is an unsatisfactory proxy for autonomy, and perhaps for this reason has dwindled in importance as a rationale in these areas. Keywords: abortion, autonomy, Charles Warren, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, Griswold v. Connecticut, In re Quinlan, Louis Brandeis, privacy, right to die, Roe v. Wade, Supreme Court CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Charles Francis Digby Moule, a Fellow of the British Academy, was probably the most influential British New Testament scholar of his time. The youngest of their three children, he was born in the same house as his father, and spent a happy if often solitary childhood in China. Moule spent three years studying theology and training for Holy Orders in the Church of England at Ridley Hall. He soon had to take on leadership of New Testament teaching at the (...) University of Cambridge for the Regius Professor, A. M. Ramsey. Moule was also fascinated, without losing his head as a critic, by the associated question of interaction between liturgy and literature in the early church, posed by such cultic interpreters of the gospels as G. Bertram. He joined the Evangelical Fellowship for Theological Literature, founded in 1942, an impressive body of younger authors that came to include Henry Chadwick, G. W. H. Lampe, S. L. Greenslade, and F. W. Dillistone; the moving spirit was Max Warren. (shrink)

The Epicurean philosophical system has enjoyed much recent scrutiny, but the question of its philosophical ancestry remains largely neglected. It has often been thought that Epicurus owed only his physical theory of atomism to the fifth-century BC philosopher Democritus, but this study finds that there is much in his ethical thought which can be traced to Democritus. It also finds important influences on Epicurus in Democritus' fourth-century followers such as Anaxarchus and Pyrrho, and in Epicurus' disagreements with his own Democritean (...) teacher Nausiphanes. The result is not only a fascinating reconstruction of a lost tradition, but also an important contribution to the philosophical interpretation of Epicureanism, bearing especially on its ideal of tranquillity and on the relation of ethics to physics. (shrink)